Israel was spared the worst of the world financial crisis of [2008][2009]. However, austerity concerns are by no means invisible in the developments in the field of civil procedure. These concerns correlate heavily with the long-standing Israeli preoccupation with 'speeding up' justice. An array of simplified procedural tracks, aimed at addressing the perceived inadequacy of 'standard' procedure, have been developed in Israel over the years. The importance of simplified procedures in the Israeli system cannot be overestimated. Their development illustrates the dialectical tension between the values of 'efficiency' and 'quality' in the administration of justice. During periods of austerity, the scales are easily (or easier) tipped in favour of efficiency and general or particular simplification of procedure. In times of prosperity, on the other hand, concerns over 'quality', access to justice, and truth discovery predominate, and attempts at promoting efficiency and/or simplification at their expense tend to be bogged down. Such attempts also tend to lose their extrinsic legitimacy and are widely viewed as 'cutting corners'. This is evident in the recent Israeli experience with civil procedure reform.
Introduction
'Austerity seems to loom over everything nowadays, and procedure is not exempt.' 1 So mused -rather wistfully -Richard Marcus in a 2013 article, while at the same time remarking that 'invoking a general fiscal crisis as a reason for making big changes in procedure seems far fetched', as '[t]he welfare state is not usually thought to include civil litigation or the way it is handled by the courts'. 2 The apparent contradiction contained in these assessments has been recently resolved, in a symbolic and resounding manner, in the Euro Summit statement on the Greece bailout. The statement listed, among other preconditions for continued financial support, 'the * Ehud Brosh, LL.M., is a research student at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 1.
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adoption [by Greece] of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is a major overhaul of procedures and arrangements for the civil justice system and can significantly accelerate the judicial process and reduce costs'. 3 There can, thus, be no more doubt (if there ever was any) that austerity does 'connect meaningfully to procedure'. 4 Israel stands apart from most OECD member countries in that it emerged from the global financial crisis with its attendant recession, which started in 2007 and still continues to be felt in large parts of Europe, virtually unscathed 5 (although signs of an economic slowdown have appeared in 2015). 6 And yet austerity concerns (in a broader sense) are by no means irrelevant to Israeli civil procedure. 7 Indeed, the opposite is true: these concerns, specifically manifested in the incessant preoccu-pation with ensuring 'speedier' and more cost-effective justice, have been a fixture -at times in the background, at times in the forefront -of the debate over the developments in the field since the 1970s. It is especially so since the beginning of this millennium, and for good reason: in the years [2001] [2002] [2003] Israel experienced a period of serious economic difficulties, entailing drastic austerity measures. 8 As will be shown, it is during this recessionary spell that some important reforms aimed at streamlining the civil justice system and saving costs were introduced. Importantly, the reforms concerned themselves not only with the general procedures applicable in civil cases but also, to a large extent, with various simplified alternatives to 'standard' procedure: either by upgrading the existing alternatives or by creating new ones. However, the trend manifested in broadening the scope of simplified procedures has also encountered considerable criticism which may affect the prospect of further reforms in the future. The debate has been reinvigorated lately by the proposed general overhaul of civil procedure, put forward by the Israeli Justice Ministry in December 2014, which is discussed below.
The aim of this article is to give an overview of the Israeli experience with simplified modes of civil procedure, while highlighting their role in the attempts to increase the efficiency of the justice system, as well as the influence of austerity factors on their development. Can Israel actually be seen as (almost) a poster case of such an influence? The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 starts with a brief sketch of the Israeli legal system in general and of the civil procedure in particular. A presentation of some salient features of civil litigation in Israel, such as the caseload burden, representation, costs, and legal aid, is also provided. Section 3 then discusses in detail, and in comparative perspective, the various simplified procedures available in Israel -with special attention being paid to rationales for each of themsuch as Small Claims Courts, summary, and fast track procedure. Section 4 touches on the dilemma inherent in (but by no means limited to) broadening the scope of simplified procedures, especially in the context of austerity -between a deep dissatisfaction with 'slow' and unreasonably expensive justice on the one hand and concern over the effects of 'cutting procedural corners' on the overall quality of justice. This dialectical contradiction is at the core of the current debate in Israel over the merits and demerits of continued simplification of civil procedure, recently rekindled by the Justice Ministry's sweeping reform proposal. Some conclusions are briefly summed up in Section 5.
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See Zilberfarb, above n. 7, at 227-31. This recession, mainly caused by worldwide collapse in the high-tech-industry (the 'dot-com crash') coincided with -and was exacerbated by -a protracted round of largescale Israeli-Palestinian violence known as the 'Second Intifada'.
Legal and Institutional Background

Civil Procedure in Israel -Sources and Trends
The Israeli legal system, which is based on a wide array of sources, historically rooted in and continuously influenced by elements of both civil and common, as well as religious law, 9 is best characterised as 'mixed' 10 or 'hybrid'. 11 It can also be generally described as pluralistic and multicultural, 12 as well as highly dynamic. 13 The system's mixed nature comes to the fore in two partly conflicting trends dominating the historical development of Israeli law: that of codification on the one hand, 14 and that of judicial 'hyper-activism', 15 carried by a predominantly 'common lawish' jurisprudence, 16 on the other. Another underlying jurisprudential trend in Israel since the 1980s -and especially so after the constitutionalisation of human rights commonly referred to as Israel's 'constitutional revolution' 17 -has been the gradual rise of (substantive) values and the decline of (formal) rules. 18 Civil procedure is one of the fields of Israeli law where the British roots run deepest. In fact, the current Israeli Rules of Civil Procedure, 1984 (hereinafter -RCP), 19 are based on a verbatim translation of the (now defunct) English Rules of the Supreme Court, first introduced to the local law by the British Mandatory power in 1938, and until lately only sparsely amended. 20 Nevertheless, despite its conservatism and traditionally highly formal nature, Israel's law of civil procedure has not remained immune to the influences of both constitutionalisation 21 and deformalisation, the last trend being in line with the developments in other jurisdictions. 22 Although the Israeli jurisprudence generally views civil procedure as a balancing instrument between two conflicting goals: stability and predictability -as embodied in black letter procedural rules -vs. discovery of the truth in order to assure justice between the litigants, 23 there is a marked lack of sympathy with procedural limitations on adjudicating the merits of the case. 24 The Israeli Supreme Court -especially under the influence of über-activist Justice Aharon Barak, who served as its member since 1978, and as the Court's President between 1995 and 2006 -has exhibited concern that overemphasis on procedure might lead to 'purely formal tactics' adopted by the parties, impairing the court's (primary) mission of truth discovery. 25 This concern is an expression of the general importance attributed by the Israeli law to the right of access to courts. 26 As a consequence, wide (and seemingly ever-growing) discretion is given to the trial judge to rectify procedural flaws. 27 This, in turn, reflects a gradual retreat from the adversarial system and towards a more interventionist role of the judge. 28 The latter trend looks set to persist and to intensify, even as the previously rather light-handed approach to procedure seems to be shifting in recent years, under Barak's successors at the helm of the Supreme Court. 29 The shift is also prominent in the proposed draft of new Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter -the Draft Rules or the Draft), intended to replace the current RCP from 1984, which was recently released by the Israeli Ministry of Justice for public perusal and discussion, 30 and is examined below. 31
Caseload Burden
The Israeli court system is notoriously overburdened. A comparative study, commissioned by the Courts Administration in 2007, found Israel is placed third in terms of the caseload burden, out of seventeen countries surveyed. 32 The case backlog is also huge: according to the official yearly report on the activity of the Israeli judiciary, at the end of 2013 it stood at 440,850 cases. 33 These data can easily explain the public dissatisfaction with the protracted length of judicial proceedings in Israel -exacerbated by a practice lacking continuous and concentrated trial 34 -which is generally perceived as unjustified red tape. Some stark anecdotal evidence exists as to how the judges themselves view the burden, including resignations and, in one extreme case, even suicide. 35 Another telling, albeit indirect, indication of the current backlog situation in Israel -(fairly) reassur- ing official statistics notwithstanding 36 -can be found in the protracted legal battle waged by the Courts Administration against a freedom of information request by Israel's leading economic newspaper, which sought to obtain data on the number of pending cases before each individual District Judge and Supreme Court Justice, and on the time that has elapsed since these cases were filed. 37 Attempts to address the problems of backlog and 'slow justice' over the last decade have been only partially successful. 38
2.3 Representation, Costs, and Legal Aid In Israel, parties in civil proceedings have a right to be represented by an attorney of their choice (with one significant exception, discussed below). 39 No mandatory representation by counsel is required, including before the Supreme Court; practically, however, a layman would lack the ability to represent himself/herself effectively even in fairly simple civil cases. 40 As representation is voluntary, attorney's fees are a matter of private agreement and generally not subject to judicial control, 41 though non-binding recommendations on the minimum rates, issued by the Israel Bar Association, exist. 42 State-funded legal aid in civil proceedings is regulated by special legislation. 43 The criteria for eligibility, based on income and assets, are rather restrictive, largely limiting free legal aid to the poor, 44 while special statutory provisions, without a 'means test', are available regarding national insurance benefit claims. 45 The Supreme Court has on occasion expressed concern over the inadequacy of the existing system of legal aid and pondered on the necessity of expanding it beyond the existing statutory provisions. 46 This inadequacy presents a serious access-to-justice problem, exacerbated by 36. According to data published by the Israeli Courts Administration, the median lifespan of a civil case now stands at 13.8 months for the Magistrates' Courts (general courts of first instance with exclusive jurisdiction of monetary claims of up to NIS 2,500,000 -c. EUR 600,000 at the current exchange rate), and at 22. Courts. 58 These do not constitute a totally separate jurisdictional body but rather a division of the Magistrates' Courts. 59 Thus, small claims jurisdiction is not exclusive but concurrent; whenever it applies, the plaintiff has a free choice between actually filing a claim in a Small Claims Court or in a 'regular' Magistrates' Court. 60 If the Small Claims Court finds the claim 'unsuitable' for adjudication before it, it has discretion to transfer the claim to the Magistrates' Court. 61 The declared aim of the creation of Small Claims Courts was to provide an 'informal, prompt, and cheap' procedure for the benefit of the 'small citizen' who might be deterred from bringing his/her claims before a regular court due to high costs and long delays. 62 The additional, if undeclared, purpose seems to be alleviating the caseload burden of Magistrates' Courts. Statutory provisions on small claims procedure reflect the above rationales. The filing fee for proceedings before a Small Claims Court is fixed at just 1% of the value of the claim (as opposed to 2.5% in regular courts). 63 Proceedings are initiated by a complaint (statement of claim) that should conform to a simplified form. 64 Small Claims Courts are not bound by rules of procedure applying to other courts. 65 They are also entitled to accept evidence which would be inadmissible under general rules. 66 In case of lack of reply or non-appearance by the defendant, the court shall give judgment solely on the basis of the complaint, subject to the claimant's declaring the veracity of the claims contained Review 196, 196 (1974 therein; 67 this amounts to a significant alleviation of the habitual burden of proof in civil cases and a deviation from general rules on default judgments. 68 The court shall give its judgment at the end of the hearing, and in any case no later than 7 days thereafter; the judgment shall be 'succinctly reasoned'. 69 The advantages (mostly for the claimant) inherent in the small claims procedure do not, however, come without a price. In order to ensure informal and prompt justice at a low cost, the Israeli legislator imposed two major constraints on the parties appearing before the Small Claims Court. First, there is no representation by attorney, except by permission from the court and for special reasons that shall be recorded. 70 This provision was introduced at the insistence of consumer advocates in order to 'even up the field' between small claimants and large commercial entities; 71 yet its positive effects on consumers are questionable. 72 The second limitation concerns the right of appeal: from Small Claims Courts there is no appeal as of right but rather by leave of the appellate court. 73 Leave for appeal can be given against final judgments only, while 'other decisions' of Small Claims Courts, such as interlocutory orders, are not appealable at all. 74 The time limit for requesting a leave for appeal in small claims proceedings is 15 days, as opposed to 30 days in proceedings before a regular court. 75 Constitutional doubts arising out of lack of appeal as of right from Small Claims Courts 76 have been dismissed by the Supreme Court. 77 Furthermore, the jurisprudence has developed a strikingly parsimonious attitude towards the grounds justifying granting leave for appeal. 78 Leave will not be granted unless there is an obvious mistake of fact or law on the part of the Small Claims Court -a mistake which can be established without requiring extended discussion or preliminary pleadings. 79 The mere fact that the court's decision raises a question of legal or public importance on which no clear case law exists does not itself justify granting leave for appeal, as small claims procedure is not considered suitable for the development of legal doctrine. Rather, leave should be granted only if the relevant question is of the kind frequently addressed by Small Claims Courts, in order not to perpetuate a mistaken judgement which might serve as precedent to the court which gave it. 80 The Small Claims Court as an institution has proven to be a resounding success in Israel. Over time, it has developed into a veritable consumer affairs court and acquired a central position in the Israeli system of consumer protection. 81 In 2013, over 14% of all actions in Magistrates' Courts were filed under the small claims track, highlighting its indispensability. 82 One indication of the Small Claims Court's wide popularity is its jurisdictional limit being raised over the years far beyond the inflation rate; so, in 2008 the maximum monetary amount within the court's jurisdiction was almost doubled. 83 This increase was wholeheartedly supported by Israel's chief consumer protection organisation. 84 The prevailing consensus in Israel is that the institutional and procedural design of the Small Claims Court, which guarantees important advantages to litigants who are indigent or of modest means, is justified in terms of promoting substantive procedural equality at the expense of truth discovery; the bargain struck between these two values is regarded as acceptable and even optimal. 85 It is no wonder, therefore, that the current small claims procedure is not affected at all by the proposed civil procedure reform. 86
Summary Procedure
The origins of the Israeli summary procedure (seder din mekutsar), now codified in RCP, Rules 202-214, can be found in the Order 14 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of England. 87 The development of the procedure in Israel has, however, largely deviated from the (now defunct) English model. 88 In fact, in its present form it bears more resemblance to procedures available in some Continental systems, such as the Italian procedimento d'ingiunzione 89 or the German Urkundenprozess ('documentary procedure'), 90 though the scope of the Israeli procedure is much wider. Rule 202 of the RCP provides for the types of claims that may be commenced by way of summary procedure. The most important category consists of claims for a liquidated sum of money, with or without interest, 'based on an express or implied contract or undertaking, provided there is written evidence thereof'. 91 Filing a claim under the summary procedure entails -in contradiction to the generally applying principles of civil litigation -a circumscription of the defendant's right to oppose the action. In order to do so, the defendant is required to apply for leave to defend; the application must be supported by an affidavit elaborating the defence in detail. 92 This requirement imposes on the defendant a duty to adopt a fixed line of defence from the outset of the proceedings, as opposed to the flexibility allowed under the general rules. 93 In a summary procedure case, the court is authorised to base its decision solely on the written motions by the parties (the complaint and the application for leave to defend), and the hearing held on the defendant's application. 94 Moreover, the application may be rejected -for reasons that are to be recordedeven without conducting a hearing on the matter. 95 The court also has discretion to make the leave to defend conditional or limited to certain terms. 96 Obviously, the above features of summary procedure offer considerable procedural advantages to the claimant. 97 It is especially so given the fact that the sanction for improperly bringing a claim within the summary procedure framework is not dismissal, but merely the striking out of the heading of the complaint and its transfer to the ordinary track. 98 These advantages can be justified in light of the summary procedure's conception as an expedited debt collection device. 99 Its rationale lies in the presumption that the defendant has no valid defence. 100 The debt collection rationale is evident in the transfer of two kinds of claims originally falling within the scope of summary procedure, to the competence of execution offices, thus eliminating the need to initiate a court proceeding altogether. 102 Only if the debtor files an 'objection' to the claim (equivalent to the application for leave to defend), is the file transferred to the competent court to be dealt with according to the summary procedure. 103 And yet the liberal attitude vis-à-vis the summary procedure by the Israeli jurisprudence -which does not seem to be shared by other jurisdictions 104 -has resulted in its extension beyond the narrow rationale of (presumably uncontested) debt collection. 105 The primary reason for this trend lies with the relaxation of the written evidence requirement. This precondition for the application of summary procedure was taken to require (based on an analogy from an unrelated provision of the French Code civil, dealing with the admissibility of oral versus written evidence) 106 not full or complete proof in writing of all elements of the claim, but merely a 'commencement of proof' (commencement de preuve), to which oral evidence could be adduced. 107 As a counterweight to their rather lax handling of the elements of Rule 202 delineating the applicability of the summary procedure, 108 Israeli courts have adopted a lenient approach towards granting leave to defend, which effectively reinstates the claim upon the regular procedural track. 109 According to the jurisprudence, the court's disposition of the motion for leave should not be used as a substitute for judging the merits of the case. 110 At this stage, it is sufficient for the defendant to show a prima facie defence, which may be based on oral against written evidence; 111 the application for leave will be rejected only if it is clear beyond doubt that the defence has no chance of succeeding. 112 The mere fact that the defence lacks credibility in the eyes of the court is not sufficient ground per se to deny the leave to defend. 113 This approach is largely motivated by the constitutional concern over unduly restricting the defendants' right of access to courts. 114 However, the accommodating policy vis-à-vis the defendants should by no means be construed as effectively nullifying the utility of the summary procedure for the claimant. In most cases initiated under the procedure, leave to defend is not requested in the first place; where the defendant does apply for the leave, and even in large claims, its granting is not assured. 115 Leave to defend will be denied if the defendant can only put up a 'sham defence' -i.e. one that is manifestlyuntrue, insufficient, or irrelevant on its faceor if the defence collapses entirely under cross-examination. 116 Although the quality of the defendant's evidence is not examined in depth at the application for leave to defend stage, the defendant's (low) probability of success is a factor that can be taken into account by the court when deciding to subject the leave to conditions or impose a security on the defendant. 117 Over the years, summary procedure has become a 'deeply rooted' Israeli institution, 118 despite being considered an exception to general procedural rules. 119 Attempts to abolish the procedure in Israel have so far been unsuccessful, largely due to the stubborn resistance of the trial lawyer community. 120 Indeed, some commentators have observed that the efficiency rationale for creating a separate privileged track for claimants with a prima facie sound claim appears sound. 121 And yet, summary procedure has been subject to harsh and mounting criticism. The arguments against it are varied. It is denounced by some en bloc as disproportionately favouring the claimants (often of the institutional 'repeat player' variety, such as banks) to the detriment of the defendants, especially those of limited means, thus impairing the principle of equality and the right of access to court. 122 On a more pragmatic level, the current summary procedure has been criticised for being overextended in scope beyond its original debt collection rationale. 123 It has also been asserted that in many cases the Israeli summary procedure fails to achieve its designated purpose of providing a mechanism to swiftly dispose of certain types of (presumably well-grounded) claims. 124 Albeit some of the deficiencies of summary procedure, as it exists today, could probably be addressed by a limited reform, 125 proposals to scrap this institution altogether have gained currency in recent years. Abolition of summary procedure was recommen- 21, at 309-10. 124. As explained by Schwartz, above n. 21, at 310-1, this is due to the courts' lenient handling of leave to defend motions, on the one hand, and of lack of priority in handling claims originally filed under the summary procedure, once the leave to defend has been granted, on the other hand.
ded in the 2008 'Ronen Report' dealing with the ways to improve the effectiveness of court proceedings in Israel. 126 The report's recommendation has been adopted in the 2014 Draft Rules. 127 This does not mean, however, that the fate of summary procedure in Israel is sealed. Even in the event the Draft Rules in their proposed version ultimately become black-letter law, which is by no means certain, 128 they will not affect the 'direct execution' track described above -which is, in practice, the summary procedure's particularly important incarnation and has just recently been expanded. 129 Moreover, data from a recently published study of judicial workload in Israel show that the summary track does indeed provide for significantly shorter delays in disposing of cases. 130 These findings, although insufficient in themselves for a comprehensive assessment of its role and desirability, have been brought up in the recent polemic against the Draft Rules as at least necessitating a thorough justification for abolishing the summary procedure, based on empirical evidence. 131 Another argument in favour of retaining the summary track is its contribution to reducing the parties' (and especially the debtors-defendants') trial costs 132 and to encouraging settlements. 133 Some writers also point out that its existence is likely to positively affect the behaviour of the parties ex ante. 134 The survival of this privileged track, at least in some form, therefore seems assured, even though its overall record within the Israeli system remains controversial. 135
Fast Track Procedure
In 2001, an important innovation was introduced into the Israeli civil procedure system. An amendment to RCP added Rules 214A-214P, creating a new 'fast track' procedure (seder din mahir). The amendment was clearly inspired by -and closely modelled on -the 1998 reform of English civil procedure as a result of the recommendations of the Woolf Report. 136 The fast track is specifically designed for claims not exceeding NIS 75,000 (approximately EUR 17,750 at the current exchange rate) 137 filed in Magistrates' Courts under the regular or the summary procedure (the latter in cases when leave to defend has been granted), as well as for those transferred from the Small Claims Courts. 138 Nevertheless, a Magistrates' Court has wide discretion to transfer claims from the fast to the regular track 139 and vice versa (in the latter case subject to the consent of all parties). 140 In making these determinations the court is to consider factors such as the complexity of the facts, issues, and evidence involved; the number of parties; the complications caused by the existence of counterclaims and impleaders; the extent of required oral evidence and expert testimony; the implications of the case for the general public; as well as the importance of the claim's speedy resolution, in light of its nature and the identity of the parties. 141 The chief purpose of the fast track procedure is to make sure that the proceedings are conducted efficiently and within a short timeframe, reducing administrative costs in a way commensurate with the relatively low sums involved. 142 The fast track, thus, obviously shares a common goal with the small claims procedure. 143 This goal is reflected in the provisions imposing on parties in fast track cases various obligations not required under the regular procedure. These include the duty to support the pleadings by affidavits verifying the facts alleged and to attach expert opinions and legal authorities to the pleadings. 144 The parties are also enjoined to provide 'early disclosure': they must attach a list of all documents relevant to the case (and not only those on which they intend to rely) as well as the relevant documents themselves, as long as they are in their possession. 145 Another innovative requirement concerns witness affidavits: these must be filed within 45 days after the pleadings, and serve as substitute for the direct examination of the witnesses; a witness from whom an affidavit has not been provided is precluded from testifying at the trial, except by special permission of the court. 146 In order to expedite the fast track proceedings, limitations are also imposed on the filing of counterclaims and impleaders, as well as on obtaining prelimi- nary relief. 147 The court may hold only one pre-trial conference, and the trial itself should normally take place over a single day. 148 The judgment in a fast track case is to be rendered immediately after the trial and in any case no later than 14 days thereafter; the reasons must be concise unless a more detailed reasoning is required due to the novelty or the public importance of the case. 149 Although the fast track provisions of the RCP do not themselves contain any limitations on the right of appeal, the goals of the fast track procedure dictate a particularly restrictive review policy of fast track judgments by appellate courts, and especially by the Supreme Court. 150 As evident from the overview above, the fast track procedure is based on two complementary principles: severe restriction of the litigants' procedural freedom to shape the proceedings and their course, coupled with a relative increase of the administrative powers of the judge. 151 Nonetheless, even the latter's discretionary powers are curtailed in comparison with the regular procedure by inflexible time limits. 152 The fairly rigid nature of the fast track procedure was criticised immediately after its adoption, and many of its provisions were even declared void in a (later overturned) Magistrates' Court decision, as being contrary to the constitutional right to a fair hearing and violating the principle of judicial independence. 153 However, despite initial doubts and criticism, the controversy rapidly subsided, and the fast track has been universally accepted as essential and highly successful. 154 The fast track's procedural limitations have been given the seal of approval by the Israeli Supreme Court: according to Justice Zilbertal in a recent decision, the notion of justice is a general and complex concept integrating, among others, considerations such as the finality of proceedings and the need to allocate judicial resources reasonably; these considerations carry special weight in the context of the fast track procedure. 155 And yet, paradoxically, the fast track's much-fêted success might carry the seed of its own undoing. At first glance, and contrary to the summary procedure, the fast track is not slated to be abolished in the 2014 Draft Rules. In fact, it is the only special procedure whose retention is envisaged. 156 However, the relative importance of the fast track as a specific procedural route for low(er)-value claims looks considerably diminished. 157 This is due to the fact that in the Draft Rules the regular procedure has largely been amalgamated with the fast track: all proceedings are to be filed in the same manner; 158 restrictions currently applying only to the fast track procedure are imposed generally on initiating counterclaims and impleaders; 159 the fast track's strict discovery requirements are to be applied universally. 160 Moreover, according to the Draft Rules, the court is granted broadest discretion to transfer claims not only from the fast to the regular track, but also in the opposite direction -without the consent of the parties. 161 The combined result of these provisions is a considerable blurring of the line separating fast track cases from the 'standard' ones. 162 The wisdom of such an approach has been questioned in recent reactions to the contemplated reform. As the critics point out, essentially erasing the procedural boundaries between small and simple claims on the one hand, and large and complex ones, on the other, does not take into account the differences inherent in the treatment of various type of cases, and could cause a general deterioration of the overall quality of judicial work (and in particular -of the standards of inquiry applied by courts), especially in (more) complex cases. 163 Additionally, there is concern that the proposed radical extension of the court's procedural discretion would, in effect, lead to a 'subjectivisation' of the judicial process in accordance with the personal predilections -or short-term considerations -of the trial judge. 164 This, of course, would be diametrically opposed to the desired goal of harmonisation of civil procedure and would also adversely affect the parties' ability to adjust their behaviour ex ante. 165 Time will tell whether -and to what extent -the above criticisms will be able to influence the course and the outcome of the civil procedure reform in Israel. As the ultimate fate of the Draft Rules remains uncertain, so is the future place of the fast track in the Israeli system. 166 Today, these timeless words ring as true as ever. The discontent over the functioning of the justice system, and in particular over the scourge of 'slow justice' is also truly a global one. 167 The public in almost every system is habitually (and increasingly) rankled over the length of time needed to obtain final judicial decisions; 168 in more extreme cases the court system's inefficiency in dealing with proceedings brought before it presents a real impediment to economic growth. 169 Israel is no exception to the global trend. The issue of 'speeding up' justice has been on the agenda of the legal community at least since the 1970s. On the one side of the continuous debate, the 'justice delayed is justice denied' adage is highlighted, 170 while the right to have one's claim tried and resolved within a reasonable time frame is viewed as an essential part of a broader human right -that of access to justice. 171 On the other side, concerns are raised over possible negative impact of a forcible reduction of delays on the rights of the parties and the quality of judicial work, as epitomised in the expression (coined by the late Israeli Supreme Court Justice S.Z. Cheshin) 'delayed justice is preferable to swift injustice'. 172 The chief preoccupation is that paying too much attention to the speed of justice, and to 'efficiency' considerations in general (usually narrowly reduced, in this context, to limiting administrative costs) would cause irreparable damage to its quality by impairing the court's primary mission -that of assuring a fair process to the parties and determining the truth. 173 In law-end-economics terms, these concerns broadly reflect two types of costs, the reduction of which is viewed as procedural law's economic objective: those of erroneous judicial decisions and those of operating the procedural system, 174 and the tension between them. 175 Additional worries are about judicial independence and the public trust in the justice system, which might both be jeopardised, so it is feared, by overemphasis on 'efficiency'. 176 In practice, outside and beyond the theoretical debate over the court system's desirable priorities, considerable efforts to reduce case backlog have been made in Israel since 2001, bringing a certain -albeit by no means drastic -improvement. 177 This modest achievement is the result of combined factors: legislative reforms such as introducing the fast track procedure, 178 raising the bar of small claims, 179 and empowering execution offices to directly enforce certain debts; 180 a vigorous -bordering on aggressive -promotion of alternative dispute resolution, especially mediation, in order to induce parties to settle without trial; 181 as well as, last but not least, the adoption by the courts of a philosophy putting greater emphasis on the allocation of limited judicial resources based on the importance of the case (with the monetary amount involved usually serving as proxy). 182 The latter rationale -which also implies a partial departure from the former approach putting truth discovery above other considerations 183 -lies at the heart of an organisational reform introduced in 2001-2002, in parallel with the adoption of the fast track procedure, establishing a new system of case management. The reform -which was inspired, similarly to the fast track, by the English model adopted in 1998 184 -authorized the creation of case allocation (literally 'file routing') departments (mahlakot le-nituv tikkim) in all courts. 185 Although many aspects of the new departments are yet to be implemented in full, their goals have been clearly formulated. They include, inter alia, sorting, classification, and evaluation of cases in order to ensure that judicial time is devoted, as far as possible, only to issues requiring judicial discretion; allocation of files to a suitable track, with the aim to optimize their treatment; making preliminary approaches to parties in order to ensure honest and expeditious proceedings and, in appropriate cases, to receive their consent to referring the case to alternative dispute resolution proceedings; creation and operation of follow-up and oversight procedures over the treatment of cases in courts; advising the parties who are not represented by counsel so as to assure equal access to courts and save costs. 186 Evident from these and accompanying provisions 187 is the intention to take over the management of proceedings, and especially of pre-trial proceedings, from the parties and their attorneys and to transfer it to the court. 188 This reflects a much more profound shift in the philosophical underpinnings of the Israeli civil procedure: from a traditional 'litigatory' model to one of 'case management', where efficiency and economy considerations reign supreme. 189 And indeed, while the Supreme Court once remarked that at least one of the aims of the new case allocation system is to bridge the power and resources gap between the litigants, 190 the main reason for its creation is to save public costs and to alleviate the caseload burden on the courts. One would assume that the motivation to adopt costcutting measures -including those in the field of civil procedure -should be at its highest in times of economic distress and would tend to weaken in times of prosperity. Israeli realities do seem to conform to this almost intuitive supposition. Prima facie, a fairly straightforward link between austerity and rolling (or scaling) back the truth discovery mission of the courts, in order to promote simplicity and finality, can be established. It is indeed especially prominent in the sphere of simplified procedures. In fact, some of the more far-reaching reforms (creation of the fast track and the new case allocation mechanism, as well as the widening of the execution offices' powers of debt collection) 191 were adopted at the time of a deep recession -bringing about in its wake harsh, across-the-board austerity cuts -traversed by Israel in the years 2001-2003. 192 Additional measures, such as raising the bar of small and fast track claims, coincided with the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. 193 Then, despite initial worries, the Israeli economy managed to cope with the consequences of the crisis quite well and emerged from it with only minimal damage. 194 The relatively good economic situation, coupled with a moderate reduction of the case backlog, seem to have cooled the reformist élan somewhat. Thus, the 2008 Ronen Report recommendation to raise the bar of fast track claims to NIS 100,000 195 has not been implemented, and other cost-saving procedural reforms have been eventually abandoned. 196 The pattern described above looks too consistent to be a mere coincidence. And yet, despite the apparent connection between the state of the Israeli economy and the incidence of procedural reform, some caveats are in order. First, the pattern is seemingly broken by the 2015 amendment increasing the maximum sum of claims amenable to the 'direct execution' track, 197 which was legislated not during a period of crisis, but rather of stable, albeit reduced, economic growth 198 (one should bear in mind, however, the rather limited scope of the change introduced). 199 Second, the straightforward rhetoric of (budgetary) austerity is virtually absent from the available published legislative debates on the adopted amendments. The terms used and the themes referred to are 'economy', 'efficiency', 200 as well as reducing the caseload burden. 201 Third, and probably most importantly, it is evident that the reforms introduced in times of economic difficulty -especially the more radical ones -require lengthy preparatory work which does not temporarily overlap with (cyclic) economic downturns. Such is prominently the case of the 2001 amendment to the RCP creating the fast track, which closely follows the 1998 'Woolf Reform' in England, but has even earlier local precursors. 202 In light of the above qualifications, what is left, if at all, of the purported link between 'austerity' and the measures to simplify Israel's civil procedure? An argument can be made that the link still exists, although it is of a more indirect and less mechanical nature. In this context, economic woes can be seen as creating a general atmosphere propitious to actually go through with reforms which might have fizzled out (or would have been postponed) in a climate of relative prosperity. 'Austerity', thus, becomes both an impetus and an ideological 'cover' for procedural simplification, which influences all the relevant parties: the reform's stakeholders, the legislators, and the general public. 203 As the atmosphere created by economic crisis dissipates, on the other hand, the impetus and the ideology's hold over hearts and minds weaken, and contrary considerations come to the fore. While this general thesis certainly requires additional research based on substantial empirical evidence may be required (not least as to its precise scope), it can be buttressed somewhat by the recentand ongoing -Israeli experience with the far-reaching proposal to simplify civil procedure incarnated in the new Draft Rules of Civil Procedure. The salient provisions of the Draft and the debate over it are sketched out below.
A New Beginning or a Dead End? The 2014
Draft Rules of Civil Procedure In the last days of 2014, the Draft Rules, drawn up by a team headed by the former Courts Administrator, Judge (ret.) Moshe Gal, were published by the Israeli Justice Ministry. The Draft's aspirations are far-reaching: it purports to replace the currently valid 1984 RCP with a modernized and 'user-friendly' civil procedure code. The radicality of the proposed reform is evident in the drastic slimming down of the black-letter substancefrom over 700 rules in the current version of the RCP to just 176. 204 This fact alone shows that the Draft's core aim is that of overall simplification and streamlining of civil procedure in Israel. While a detailed analysis of specific substantive provisions of the Draft Rules is outside the scope of this article, it is clear that their main thrust is to unify all proceedings largely 'under one roof'. 205 Even though the proposed unification is incomplete (the small claims are unaffected, summary procedure survives in part, and the fast track is retained in principle), 206 the effect of the reform on both 'regular' and simplified procedures is easily discernible: the two are being 'merged', with the 'standard' civil procedure now looking more like a 'simplified' one itself. This 'submerging' of the simplified procedures by 'regular' procedure, while certainly not rendering the former (completely) redundant, does significantly reduce their prominence. What is even more important, however, is the Draft's underlying philosophy. It marks a departure from the formerly prevalent approach of procedural flexibility towards more rigidity. 207 It seals the process of transformation of the Israeli system from (an originally adversarial, later more inquisitorial) 'procedure' into 'case management', focused on 'efficiency'. 208 As a matter of fact, although the goals of 'efficiency' and 'swift justice' are not included in the Draft Rules themselves (which only specifically refer, in the introductory chapter devoted to 'Basic Principles', to 'resolution [of disputes] within a reasonable time'), 209 they are peppered through the Draft's explanatory notes. 210 In the end result, the delicate pre-existing balance between 'economy' (meaning, in this context, a speedy resolution of cases) and 'quality' (meaning a thorough investigation of the evidence and of the parties' arguments) 211 is tilted drastically in the Draft in favour of 'economy'. 212 Given all this, it is not a major exaggeration to say that the Draft Rules, if adopted, would represent a paradigmatic, almost tectonic shift in Israeli civil procedure law. The elaboration of the Draft Rules occurred completely under the radar, and their publication was not preceded by public debate. 213 The reactions to the Draft from both the academic and the practicing lawyer community have been predominantly negative; 214 in fact, it seems the only active support for the Draft Rules has come from the 'Gal team' members themselves. 215 The criticisms levelled against the Draft are varied, 216 but behind most of them one general concern can easily be identified: that the proposed reform goes way too far in its simplification and homogenisation drive. 217 The general, overriding criticism points out to the limits of (over-)simplification: the Draft is based on a (naïve) assumption that 'simple rules will turn the reality into a simple one'; 218 however, when 'simple' rules come into contact with a complex reality, elaborate interpretative adjustments are inevitably required. 219 The reform is thus liable to generate more problems than it purports to solve, while upsetting the balancing act between the various goals and values of civil procedure, created and maintained by the legislator and the courts over the years. 220 Ultimately, and to use Adrian Zuckerman's terminology, the Draft Rules, instead of 'rationing procedure', end up rationing access to justice. 221 Rather unsurprisingly, this attack on the simplification drive of the Draft Rules is aided by recent criticisms of the achievements of the Woolf reform. 222 In light of the above, what does the future hold in store for the Draft Rules? According to a Talmudic saying, prophecy has been given to fools and children; 223 this is all the more true with regard to pending (secondary) legislation. Nevertheless, drawing on past Israeli experience, the current juncture does not look particularly propitious for a major break with the accepted status quo (which has remained unchanged in its foundations since the time of the British Mandate in the 1930s, and has only been tampered with in a piecemeal fashion and rather sparingly). The recent procedural reforms sacrificing 'quality' on the altar of 'efficiency' (which, as shown, have mostly coincided with periods of economic downturn), were either mostly uncontroversial (as in the case of the changes concerning the small claims and the summary tracks) 224 or faced only limited and brief criticism (as in the case of the fast track procedure). 225 The determined opposition encountered by the new Draft is of a totally different nature. It shows that, notwithstanding the continuing dissatisfaction with the justice system's performance, and especially with its slowness, the force of cost-saving 'efficiency' arguments has weakened considerably; 226 and that a crisis mentality favouring drastic reform is largely absent both in the legal profession and among the political decision-makers. It is thus understandable that one of the chief criticisms raised against the reform put forward in the Draft Rules is that it is 'superfluous'. 227 This 'don't fix it if it isn't broken' logic seems to be carrying the day at this point. 228 Time will tell whether this conservative attitude will continue to prevail in the middle term.
Concluding Remarks
The recent global financial and economic crisis has highlighted that civil procedure is not exempt from austerity considerations. Although the last crisis barely made a dent in the Israeli economy, concerns over the perceived inefficiency of the existing civil procedure have dominated the Israeli public debate for years. These concerns centre largely on the excessive length of proceedings; 'slow justice' with its attendant inefficiencies and potential injustices (which are exacerbated by high litigation costs) is widely perceived as the bane of the current system. Over the years, various simplified procedures have been created and developed by the legislator for certain types of claims, providing alternatives -and complements -to the regular track. These procedures, overviewed in detail in the present article, have served an invaluable role in alleviating the overall litigation burden of Israeli courts. They also seem to have successfully charted the middle ground between the two opposing poles: one of 'economy', concerning itself with the limited resources of the justice system and the need for speedy and final resolution of disputes, and the other one, that of 'quality', emphasising the courts' primary mission of truth discovery as a pre-requisite to arriving at a 'just' solution. Some measure of the success of simplified procedures in Israel can be seen in the substantial widening of their scope in the years 2000, with little or no opposition. This enlargement of the simplified procedures' relative weight within the Israeli system (including the creation of a new 'fast track' for low-value claims) was mostly greeted with approval on the part of both the members of the legal profession and the general public. However, the ball did not stop there. In fact, the simplified procedures' accomplishments have carried over to the regular procedure, and the policy makers appear to have come close to being carried away by them. The recent reform proposal by the Justice Ministry, embodied in the 2014 Draft Rules, represents a transfusion of norms and principles derived from simplified procedures into the 'standard' civil procedure. As shown in the article, the Draft blurs the boundaries between the 'simplified' and the 'regular' procedures to a great extent. Contrary to previous reforms, this blurring of the lines has elicited largely negative reactions and even a sort of a backlash, putting a question mark over the reform's prospects both in the short and the middle term. The vigorous opposition to the proposed Draft Rules symbolises the limits of the attempts to further simplify civil procedure in the name of 'efficiency' and 'speeding up justice', beyond lower-value and prima facie 'simple' claims. It also illustrates the connection between austerity and civil procedure reform: simplification of procedure, sacrificing 'quality' on the altar of efficiency, are accepted and even hailed by the public in times of real or perceived crisis; with good economic performance, concerns for assuring truth discovery -which requires a comprehensive examination of evidence and the parties' arguments -come to the fore. While more research on the connection between austerity and civil procedure is needed, the Israeli example does show that attempts to tilt the balance toward (ever more) 'efficiency' in civil procedure outside austerity/crisis situations are viewed with suspicion, as unjustified endeavours to 'cut corners'.
